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Human development and human rights share a common vision and purpose: to 
secure the freedom, well being and dignity of humanity.  Human development is as 
essential for human rights as the latter is for the former.  Historical evidence suggests 
that the more civilised societies were those that gave a higher priority to both, for 
example, the Greek, the Roman and the enlightened years of early Islam. The 
freedom from want is perhaps the one inalienable right of humanity which stands 
between dignity and indignity and which must be mitigated against by both state and 
individual.
1 For the first time in history mankind adopted these and other human 
rights when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United 
Nations in 1948.  Today all but one of the six core covenants and conventions have 
been ratified by at least 140 countries and state sponsored anti-poverty programmes 
were initiated globally, most with the help of civil society [UNDP (2000)]. 
The lessons from history clearly establish that for improving the social 
endowment of the poor the state and the individual are key players, money is a 
necessary requirement, good governance is critical to success and the participation of 
each component of society as a whole ensures sustainability and continued benefits 
beyond the initial attempts to mitigate the impact of poverty. In other words 
decentralisation is a key element to improve the lot of the people, particularly the 
poor and the disenfranchised. 
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1The first informal recognition of this lies in the alms-giving encouraged by all religions and 
beliefs, and was formally codified by Islam through zakat and ushr (a form of redistributing wealth and 
agricultural income respectively) as a religious duty [the Koran].  In fact, this was applied with such zeal, 
and the partnership between state and individual was so effective that in the days of Caliph Umar Farooq 
(634-644 AD) the collections from zakat and ushr could not be distributed as no one could qualify as a 
mustaheq (deserving poor).  The state system was unfortunately allowed to lapse.  Individual and private 
efforts to mitigate poverty and endow the poor with social capital, however, continued throughout the 
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Governance is generally conceived of as the exercise of economic, political 
and administrative authority to improve the quality of life of the people and  is a 
continuing process where divergent opinions and desires are satisfied through 
compromise and tolerance in a spirit of cooperative action for the mutual benefit of 
the larger whole.  It has three dimensions: one, the political regime; two, the systems 
and procedures for exercising authority; and three, the capacity of governments 
[World Bank (1994); UNDP (1997); OECD (1995); Commission on Global 
Governance (1995)].  The basic objective of good governance is to improve the 
quality of life of people, to ensure that their needs are met equitably and that 
disparities in income are reduced over time and is best attained through the effective 
participation of people, that is through decentralising the apparatus of the state to the 
closest level to people, namely local governments.  The incidence of poverty is one 
measure of whether governance in any nation or state is good or bad. 
Politics is about the creation and distribution of power, be it within 
organisations, tribes, communities or society at large.  Governance is the mechanism 
which controls the relationship between the two extremes—the governed and the 
governors.  And the political process lies at the core of governance and this can be 
said to be efficient only if elections are free and fair; the elected are accountable; 
authority is divided between the legislature, the bureaucracy and the judiciary; and, 
power is decentralised. 
By definition, decentralisation distributes power, resources, decisions and 
capacities from central to sub-national governments (mainly municipalities) and 
communities [IADB (1999)].  The processes of decentralisation focus on the “formal 
institutions of government”, both political and administrative [Parker and Serrano 
(2000)].  It has come to be widely regarded as an important instrument for supporting 
the factors needed to create effective local governance and promote grass roots 
development.  It is increasingly being realised that central governments cannot do it 
all, and that the active involvement of both communities and representative local 
governments is a requisite for a thriving local development. 
While much of the drive for decentralisation may be political, the main 
economic justification has been to improve efficiency.  And the important aspect of 
efficiency in decentralisation is information—lower tiers that have better information 
about what kind of services they want and are willing to pay for.  Within the region, 
support for decentralisation has reflected general beliefs about its role in 
strengthening democracy, overcoming social imbalances and improving the 
provision of services.  But what must always be kept in mind is that the form of the 
decentralisation process chosen must reflect specific national conditions, policies and 
priorities. 
Decentralisation is complex and encompasses a wide range of elements 
[Parker (1995)].  Evidence from many countries would seem to suggest that three 
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governance [Manor (1999)].  Firstly, significant powers and responsibilities for local 
service delivery should be devolved to representative local authorities in line with 
their capacities i.e. political decentralisation.  Secondly, sufficient resources, through 
a combination of local taxes and grants from higher level governments, must be 
provided to enable local governments to fulfil their responsibilities, That is, fiscal 
decentralisation. And finally, proper channels for accountability are needed to 
encourage strong accountability between bureaucrats and elected representatives, and 
between elected representatives and their electorate i.e. institutional decentralisation.  
At its best, decentralisation does not simply transfer centralised functions to the local 
level but simultaneously reorganises the roles and responsibilities of central 
governments, local government and communities, and opens government processes 
to greater involvement by the people.  
Institutional factors, more often than not, impede effective decentralisation.  
In Pakistan, rural self-government worked well soon after independence through the 
panchayat system. The rural population abandoned this in favour of a more 
centralised system, which resulted in denial of access to basic services.  While lack 
of institutional capacity was cited as a reason for disbandment of the participatory 
system, the newer system left a majority of the citizens with no voice and 
participation and no access to basic public services.  Indonesia on the other hand, is 
now nurturing self-government in rural areas though its village development and 
poor villages grants programmes [Shah (1997)]. Contrary to common miscon-
ceptions, the success of decentralisation policies requires a strong responsive and 
accountable government at the national level. The success of decentralised structures 
on the other hand critically depends upon the higher level enabling environment and 
citizen participation and less so on the local institutional capacity and information 
network as confirmed by the Colombian experience [Fiszbein (1995)]. 
Poverty is an outcome of the interaction of economic, social, legal and 
political processes mediated through a range of institutions.  By removing these 
barriers to poverty reduction, the state can help to empower the poor to improve their 
lives.  The interaction between the quality of governance and democracy, the rule of 
law and the extent of devolution, decentralisation and autonomy determine the 
success of state institutions in being “pro-poor.”  In essence, therefore, there are four 
ingredients in the relationship between governance and poverty: one, democracy, 




In any society the key dimensions to poverty are both being unheard and 
powerless.  Democracy requires one, regular and peaceful elections; two, highly 
inclusive participation by all; and three, freedom of expression, of the press, to form 
and join organisations, and to information.  It is argued that democracy will reduce Ismail and Rizvi  1016
these barriers to poverty eradication through empowerment.  However, this is not 
necessarily achieved, principally because the poor are excluded from access due the 
lack of education, knowledge, opportunity, economic power, information, etc.   
Unless elected to local office the likelihood of the poor having access to the elected 
is non-existent. Thus the poor need a direct voice in the interventions that affect them 
on a day to day level, and to build up their assets to prevent their exclusion.  On the 
other hand, democracies appear to be more favourable for the income, health, and 
education dimensions of poverty.  Further, a free press can create awareness in the 
public and increase transparency and accountability in governance.  This in turn 
helps in reducing corruption, reduces the arbitrary use of authority and increases the 
potential for meeting the needs of the poor.  All of which combined contribute to 
higher rates of growth. 
Democracies, more often than not, fail to deliver on pro-poor programmes.  
Bardhan (1997); Bardhan and Mookharjee (1999) and Easterley (1999) state that the 
poor performance of democratic institutions in this respect may be due to the capture 
and manipulation by the elites and the middle-classes.  The former as a consequence 
of economic power and the latter their ability to lobby and corner resources.   
Systems, procedures and politicians add to the low pro-poor performance.  Inherently 
democratic processes are slow, cumbersome and could lead to deadlock, and 
politicians need to show results, thus the temptation to succumb to populist 
programmes which are visible rather than best for long term growth and equity.  But 
because they are inherently more transparent and accountable, on the whole, 
however, it cannot be argued “that less democracy is better for economic growth and 
poverty reduction” [ADB (2000)]. 
Unfortunately, Pakistan does not meet at least three criteria for good 
governance.  The lethal combination of powerful personalities (or a coterie of a few 
families who are linked together by inter-marriage) and weak institutions (which are 
of their own making) has resulted in the subversion of law, the deprivation of 
people’s sovereignty, the lack of accountability and a process which remains largely 
personal and informal and allows rulers to operate outside established institutional 
frameworks.  Democracy, when present, is confined largely to the ballot box—and 
that too for the legislatures only.  Political parties do not hold elections for office.  
Decision-making is controlled by the powerful elite.  Sovereignty is equated to 
powerful governments, not free citizens. 
Because of the highly personalised control over power and resources, 
institutions are weakened and decisions are arbitrary and prone to informal 
transactions. The elite power structure consists of landlords, who have a 
disproportionate share of seats in the legislatures and thereby frustrate reform, a 
handful of large industrialists who cumulatively control resources which are equal to 
or greater than the federal budget, bureaucrats who have gained power as a 
consequence of weak political structures and the military, which have overtly ruled Governance, Decentralisation, and Poverty  1017
for half or more of the time and covertly for considerably longer.  The last of the 
quartet justify their rule as a consequence of a breakdown in civil rule and political 
governments failing to legitimise themselves. 
HDC [1999] argues that thus democracy has not been translated into visible 
benefits for the poor and queries “Can people be truly free when they have no 
control over their destinies?”  The moral foundations of most governments in 
Pakistan are weak, to say the least. The are founded on electoral fraud, money 
politics, criminalisation of the political system and increasing corruption.  It has 
weakened societal structures to such that all governments (elected or not) appear to 
have the same face as a result of inter-marriage and cross-part representation by 
each of the elite families.  They also constitute a fair portion of the bureaucracy, 
the judiciary and the military as the youngest are “encouraged” to seek a career to 
safeguard familial interest.  Thus they control the economy, and benefit 
disproportionately. 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings there are positive gains which have 
accrued to society in Pakistan as a consequence of democracy.  Proponents for 
democracy also argue that the behaviour of the politician is the consequence of 
societal structures.  This is largely based on fiefdom-tribal, biradari (brotherhood), 
and familial.  Owing to rampant illiteracy and a lack of awareness of alternatives, 
votes are cast on the basis of these loyalties.  They also argue that over time there has 
been a change which has led to a more open atmosphere of debate and compromise 
which has resulted in a freedom of speech and of expression, some improvement in 
human rights.  They also point to the freedom enjoyed by the press.  The press have 
gained such strength that attempts to muzzle it by recent governments did not prove 
successful. 
In a comparison of performance between democratic and authoritarian 
governments since independence from India, Ismail (1998) and SPDC (2000) have 
shown that while governments under authoritarian rule in Pakistan were good for 
economic growth, they were not necessarily as successful in improving human 
endowment.  It can be argued this is a consequence of the complex and cumbersome 
mechanisms of accountability and consensus formation in democratic regimes which 
lead to investment into social capital.  These checks and balances put a limit to rent-
seeking, the need to trim sails for re-election, and thereby encourages the 
development of social infrastructure, such as schools, clinics, water supply schemes, 
etc.  This is borne out by international experience [Bardhan (1997); Przeworski and 
Limongi (1993); Sen (1999)]. While authoritarian regimes do not face these 
problems they, nevertheless, face serious dangers of abuse of state power.  Rehman 
[forthcoming] says that owing to these very irritating procedures democratic 
governments cannot make big mistakes while experience in Pakistan shows that 
autocratic governments have made blunders which were exposed ex-post. He, 
therefore, concludes that even a bad democracy is, in the long-run better for nations Ismail and Rizvi  1018
than good authoritarian rules.  The question that emerges from his arguments is have 
democratic governments in Pakistan been pro-poor? 
Narrowly understood as the right to vote in elections, democracy is an indirect 
and often incomplete mechanism for benefiting the poor.  They need a direct voice in 
the interventions that affect them, as well as the ability to organise themselves 
politically and vote selectively.  For instance, while Mr  Bhutto is attributed to have 
made the mass of the population more aware of their political rights to select their 
candidate, mechanisms to ensure that the poor had an effective voice were not 
instituted, voting on the basis of peer pressure was rampant, and democracy was not 
introduced within the political parties themselves. Thus the leaders and the 
candidates were self-selected.  Further, an analysis of the card carrying membership 
of the political parties shows that very few, if any, were from below the poverty line.  
Action, therefore, is needed to bring down legal, political and social barriers that 
work against particular groups and to build up the assets of the poor to prevent 
exclusion. 
An effective opposition ensures that leaders are responsive to their electorate.  
A free press and an active non-governmental advocacy sector draw public attention 
to current events.  Civil liberties linked to press freedom and unimpeded access to 
the law increase transparency and accountability, reduce corruption and increase the 
potential for meeting the needs of the poor.  Political rights, civil liberties, and press 
freedom collectively provide greater protection for the poor from the arbitrary use of 
discretionary powers and authority by officials, both elected and appointed. 
To make democracies more pro-poor, governments and external agencies 
need to collaborate to ensure that anti-poverty measures and programmes are more 
effective.  This would require that the institutional environment ensures that the poor 
engage in collective action on their own behalf.  Therefore, the changes needed 
dictate that institutional reforms should consist of, one, a pro-poor political 
environment, two, accountability of public officials, three, appropriate programmes 
and institutional mechanisms to support them, and four, benefits that are legally 
recognised and enforceable at law, if required. 
RULE OF LAW 
Legislation creates the environment which can lead to both stable and higher 
levels of economic growth as it can be predictable, define property rights, guarantee 
long-term security, boost investment, and lower transaction costs. By both 
stimulating growth and guaranteeing property rights, it increases the prospects of 
poverty reduction through an increase in incomes and empowering the poor.  The 
daily lives of poor people are deeply affected by how well the legal system works.  
Harassment, lawlessness, and violence are ever present threats to the poor people.  
To mitigate this aspect of poverty, the poor should be able to access entitlements 
without complication and be free of the fear of lawlessness and harassment.  Further, Governance, Decentralisation, and Poverty  1019
the laws must not be discriminatory, either in design, application, access or 
execution. 
Ignorance of the law (as it is written, and the poor have low literacy levels) 
and poverty (as they cannot afford the time and money costs of legal transaction) are 
important causes of lack of access to the law and its protection.  Further, language, 
ethnic, caste and gender barriers, their greater vulnerability and other exclusionary 
practices exacerbate the knowledge problem and their distrust of the justice system 
as a whole.  Lacking the wherewithal, the poor people are often forced to forgo the 
protection of the law, even while engaged in legal activities. 
While the constitution enshrines the rights of people, only some basic rights 
are justiciable, others, (economic, social and cultural), contained in the  Directive 
Principles of Policy, are not.  However, the Supreme courts have found innovative 
mechanisms for ensuring that even these are reviewed and that too rapidly through a 
system of participatory justice.  Single applications of public interest are received 
directly by the highest levels and cases are disposed off relatively rapidly. 
Because many of the problems affecting the poor are common civil, society 
organisations can help the poor through class action, thus seeking redress for issues 
which affect a group of the poor.  Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms 
of mediation and arbitration could help explain the law and reduce the delays and 
corruption which are today an integral part of dispute settlement.  They could also 
provide more predictable outcomes as the arbitrators would be more aware of ground 
realities regarding the dispute. 
The government’s proposed devolution plan is expected to create such 
mechanisms and through the involvement of the local councillors and vigilance 
committees ensure a higher degree of redress to the poor. 
 
BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL DECAY 
Perhaps the greatest barrier to poverty reduction is the ossification of 
institutions which have over time drawn away from the poor through capture by the 
elite and interest groups.  North (1991) states institutions are “the humanly devised 
constraints that structure human interactions.”  They consist of informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, codes of conduct) and formal regulations 
(constitutions, laws, property rights).  Institutions thus include a wide range of 
observed phenomena, ranging from social networks to the state, that interact with 
each other. 
Both economic growth and poverty reduction are dependent on the quality of 
state institutions and macro-economic management.  Investment is attracted to 
environments which are stable, provide a consistent set of policies and where 
contracts can be easily enforced.  There is considerable evidence to link higher-
quality governance to a higher pace of economic growth and to higher levels of 
health and education, which are crucial in helping the poor become upwardly mobile.  Ismail and Rizvi  1020
The latter then improves the quality of governance.  Countries with higher-quality 
governance, particularly in managing the economy, have been able to respond to 
external shocks more rapidly and have thus been able to dampen the impact on the 
poor. 
The efficient allocation of resources to ensure wide spread and equitable 
economic and social development of a nation is the basic responsibility of any 
government and this can only be achieved through good governance.  Another aspect 
of good governance is achieving appropriate regulatory balance for growth and for 
increasing income-earning opportunities for the poor. In Pakistan the state straddles 
all economic, social and cultural activities through a variety of agencies, ranging 
from government to Quangos.  Its contribution to equitable and sustainable economic 
and social development is minimal compared to the resources they pre-empt and the 
inefficient manner in which these are consumed.  The inefficiency is in the role and 
composition of government: rather than ensuring the delivery of basic social 
services, redistributing resources and ensuring economic, social and societal 
stability, they have stepped into trade and production and over-zealous control of the 
private sector.  These have generated inefficiencies, rents accruing only to vested 
interest groups; income disparities are rising as is unemployment and corruption. 
“Corruption is the misuse of public power, office, or authority for private 
benefit” [UNDP (1999)].  Petty corruption occurs when public servants are grossly 
underpaid and may demand kickbacks and speed money to feed their families.   
While people may tolerate such demands, this is not generally approved.  This 
impacts more on the poor. Empirical evidence suggests that the burden of corruption, 
measured as a proportion of income, is much greater on the poor.  Grand corruption 
involves the higher levels of officialdom, both elected and appointed, which make 
decisions regarding large contracts, make or change policy or laws through enabling 
powers contained in badly drafted acts.  For example, these could and do operate 
though the issuance of quasi legislation in Pakistan, the SRO
2, which either provides 
relief from taxation or gives specific economic benefits to a vested interest group.  
This benefits the rich, but affects the poor adversely. 
Poor governance leads to, nay encourages and breeds, corruption in a number 
of ways, for instance through bribery and extortion, speed money, influence peddling 
and nepotism, and fraud and embezzlement.  Low levels of corruption exist where 
the institutional arrangements between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary 
have effective mechanisms to identify, prevent and punish wrongdoing, provide few 
opportunities for corruption and society does not accept this.  In other words, 
systems are transparent and officials are accountable.  This is seen in decentralisation 
of functions.  High levels of corruption occurs when the mechanisms to combat 
corruption are either weak or are not used, there are no checks and balances, there is 
extensive government control and regulation, and where, because it is so pervasive, 
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society accepts and tolerates this as the norm, equating this to gifts.  Its incidence is 
highest where high degrees of centralisation or concentration exists.  However, 
Obasanjo (1994) makes the distinction between accepting a gift and accepting bribes: 
“The distinction between gifts and bribes is easily recognisable.  A gift can be 
accepted openly; a bribe has to be kept secret”. 
Corruption is uneconomical, unsafe and threatens people, especially the poor, 
and governments.  Corruption can be brutal to the poor who have no resources to 
compete against those with the wherewithal to pay bribes.  It denies the poor their 
fair share and increases poverty by redirecting relief resources to corrupt government 
officials and business men.  It encourages gender disparity as it redistributes from the 
poor (who are mostly women) to officials (mostly men).  It damages the economy 
and slows, sometimes reverse, development.  It can be used to pose environmental 
and health hazards and render legislation ineffective.  Corruption is thus an issue of 
governance—the failure of institutions. 
Most planners and economists agree that the best mechanism for sustaining 
growth into the future is to ensure effective governance.  This may be realised 
through reforms in civil services, improving the capacity of institutions to frame 
coherent policies and ensure their consistent implementation over time, improving 
tax and fiscal administration, developing suitable measures for legal recourse, 
increasing the role of the private sector, decentralising public effort, devolution of 
fiscal powers, improving resource mobilisation at all tiers of government and 
controlling unproductive public expenditures. 
Pakistan’s public institutions faced with a basket of shortages and 
shortcomings.  There is a skill shortage for identifying and enunciating coherent and 
coordinated policies; the work ethos discourages initiative and efficiency; systems 
and procedures are cumbersome and outdated; coordination mechanisms exist but 
are not implemented; staff is inadequately trained both ab initio and subsequently 
on-job because of the very short-term assignment to posts; staff selection, posting 
and promotions are not merit related; and the incentive structure is designed to 
penalise the performers.  Administrative capacity and capability are an important 
component of good governance.  By affecting the quality of public service delivery, 
administrative capacity and capability directly affects the well-being of the poor.  
Merit based recruitment and promotion linked to performance, market-based wages 
and autonomy from the political process are perhaps the most crucial elements for  
improving bureaucratic performance.  Combined they will help reduce corruption 
and bureaucratic delays. 
Central to the creation of institutional capacity is the effective decentralisation 
of functions.  This means that effective financial powers, administrative authority 
and commensurate responsibility must be given to lower echelons but within a tight 
regulatory framework.  The current practice of requests for supplementary grants 
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expenditures in excess of budget allocations would need to be exercised in the same 
manner as the budget allocations itself, that is by the legislature in assembly through 
a process of dialogue “ex-ante”. 
Analysing the institutional decay in Pakistan SPDC (2000) concludes 
“Institutional reform must be a component of structural reforms within the civil 
services.  The objective should be to make the service more professional and 
accountable.  While these reforms could be painful in the short-run the benefits from 
these reforms would be substantial in the long-run.  These would include, but not be 
limited to, a smaller size of the civil bureaucracy, a lower per unit cost of service 
and infrastructure, and greater efficiency in government.  The current status of 
“permanent non-terminable” employment must be replaced by a system where the 
inefficient or the corrupt can be weeded out within a short time frame.  Staff skills 
need to be developed to use modern management techniques”. 
The remedy prescribed by several studies have stated that much of the faults 
in the civil services can be remedied through a redefinition of its role.  Firstly, the 
civil services should be taught that they are meant to implement policy and not make 
it.  Secondly, it must be limited to maintaining law and order, providing a regulatory 
framework for economic activities, promoting human development and encouraging 
participatory governance.  Thirdly, they must be open and transparent in their 
dealings. 
Efficiency can be achieved in a number of ways.  One may be the use of 
appropriate mechanisms which ensure the greatest value for money.  Other ways 
may include pro-active legislation (rather than retro-active) ensuring target based 
management, or through the use of information to analyse shortcomings and suggest 
ways to improve.  Yet others may be the use of regulatory mechanisms which ensure 
that private sector provision of services and development of infrastructure does not 
create rents for the vested segments of society. 
 
DEVOLUTION AND DECENTRALISATION 
State institutions are seen to be monoliths too far removed from ground 
realities and there to serve the interest of the elite and vested interest groups.  They 
are not seen to be pro-poor as systems and procedures are archaic, time consuming, 
cumbersome and access is effectively denied to the poor through rationing of visiting 
hours.  Most studies have established that for making them more pro-poor is either 
through decentralisation (ceding power from the centre to a local government or 
agency with the centre government keeping some measure of oversight) or through 
devolution (more complete and permanent form of decentralisation, in which the 
power of the centre is more limited).  Studies around the world have shown that 
effective decentralisation does benefit the poor as development and safety net 
programmes can be more effective in meeting local needs if they can draw on the 
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people) as they rest on local information, local accountability, and local monitoring. 
Yet there are important caveats to decentralisation.  In settings where the local 
power structure is unequal, such as in feudal or tribal societies, or where the 
concentration of economic power is skewed, local government institutions are liable 
to elite capture and to be swayed by a large and vocal middle class through their 
ability to lobby.  Further, evidence suggests that decentralisation could also lead to a 
worsening of the gender balance and girls may have less access to education, health 
care and other basic services.  By itself decentralisation cannot make state 
institutions pro-poor.  It must be accompanied by systemic changes and changes 
in work ethos.  It must be adequately supported and safeguarded by a strong 
political will from the centre.  It is, therefore, necessary to ensure that the 
relationship between local government agencies and communities are meaningful 
and designed to help the poor and disenfranchised segments.  To ensure that the poor 
benefit decentralisation must be approached cautiously.  Effectively implemented it 
has the potential to improve immediate development outcomes, improve cost-
effectiveness of both implementation and delivery, and be the catalyst for broader 
institutional reforms which benefit and empower the poor. 
Some hidden benefits from effective decentralisation and its partnering with 
community involvement would be a reduction in corruption, an increase in cost-
effectiveness of services, and an increase in targeting efficiency for social safety net 
programmes designed to ameliorate the lot of the poor.  Empowered, and hopefully 
thereby enlightened communities themselves would be able to identify the truly 
needy and the credit worthiness of individuals in any such schemes, particularly 
those involving access to micro-credit. 
Barriers to devolution are more likely to be presented by financial resources 
(owing to existing patterns in the allocation of fiscal powers and intergovernmental 
fiscal relations); human resources (owing to problems in quality, remuneration and 
motivation); reluctance to devolve power (owing to a lack of political will and the 
urge to draw economic rents); weak institutional capacity (as a consequence of 
archaic rules and regulations governing human resource management, the lack of 
continuing skill development programmes, the induction of alternative technologies 
suited to local conditions, and the dichotomy in employing two sets of staff - those 
recruited locally and those on deputation from the provincial ser5vices or unified 
local council services with their divided loyalties and rapid turnover); and the use of 
antiquated systems and procedures (most dating from the days of the British ‘raj’). 
With no explicit constitutional existence, the lowest tier of government can be 
superseded at the discretion of the provincial governments.  However, social sector 
services are grassroots services which need to be provided at the local level by 
effective and continuous local governments with the participation of the 
communities.  This would, ensure the inclusion of the poor themselves in the 
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more time to devote to these tasks.  This effective devolution can only be guaranteed 
by amending the Constitution (as India has done) to ensure that local councils cannot 
be set aside by the provincial governments, that they have a list of distinctive 
responsibilities, and that they have the resources to fulfil these responsibilities.  This 
may require creating an arrangement similar to the National Finance Commission 
(NFC) which sets out the resource-sharing arrangements between the federation and 
the provinces every five years. 
In the last decade and a half two major programmes were started with the 
avowed intention of both devolution and decentralisation.  Both the Five Point 
Programme as well as SAP, are failures both in the reform of the institutions for and 
the delivery of public services.  In both the programmes, the responsibility for 
delivery of services rested with the provincial governments while policy and 
financial controls lay with the federal government.  SAP at least attempted to 
delegate some responsibility for operation, maintenance and monitoring to local 
communities. The management committees have hardly functioned in any 
meaningful manner, largely because these are not legal bodies nor are they 
representative.  As they are transient in nature their sustainability is questionable.  
Nevertheless these management committees have had some degree of success in a 
number of areas, for example, the School Management Committees in the Punjab. 
These general failures and shortcomings in both the Five Point Programme 
and SAP suggest that the need is for far-reaching institutional reforms.  Perhaps, the 
answer lies not in partially delegating responsibility, but in effective devolution of 
full authority and responsibility over local matters.  The time has come to consider 
the establishment of effective integrated local governments which are consti-
tutionally mandated with executive and legislative arms and authority to tax and 
spend. 
This implies devolution of federal and provincial functions and powers to 
local governments.  This, however, is a political decision, and determined through an 
inter-play of historical, administrative and technical factors. Conceptually the 
question as to ‘what to decentralise’ can be determined by the presence or absence of 
three characteristics: externality (spillovers), chargeability (extent of self-financing), 
and technicity (relating to economics of scale and institutional capacity). 
The current government strategy to alleviate poverty hinges on the devolution 
of power to the local governments.  The general opinion about the Plan is that it is 
deficient in a number of ways.  Firstly, the plan is likely to further compound the 
confusion by adding tehsil and village councils to the roster of local bodies.  It is 
argued that in many parts of the country a number of villages are not an integrated 
community entity, while others are single household entities and some, comprising 
of nomads, are also mobile.  Secondly, planning for and production of services 
requires a minimum critical mass of area, population and resources and fiscal 
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citizenry. An upper tier, which meets the critical mass and economies of scale 
considerations, and a lower tier, which meets the economies of scope (for people’s 
participation and accountability), service efficiency and equity considerations. The 
district and the metropolitan/municipal corporations appear to fulfil the requirements 
of critical mass and economies of scale for the production of major services. The 
union and municipal/town committee appear to fulfil the requirements of economies 
of scale, service efficiency and equity.  However, the larger urban centres will need 
to have the more elaborate governing structure of metropolitan governments. 
Proponents of the Plan argue that there is merit to the creation of the tehsil and 
village councils and of the Citizen Community Boards (CCBs).  With responsibility 
for delivering municipal services and for acting as the bridge between the 
populations in the urban centres and the rural areas, the tehsil councils would be able 
to plan in an integrated manner for the development of both.  They could thus ensure 
that the urban areas would become the market centres for agricultural inputs and 
output from the surrounding rural hinterland, and also centres for agro-based 
industries.  Further by locating basic infrastructure, such as the higher tiers of 
education and health infrastructure in these towns, they would reduce the rural-urban 
migration.  The village councils could well become the focal point for establishing 
the facility level supervisory agencies that were created under the SAP with only 
some degree of success.  As these Boards will be selected by elected local 
governments, they should be more representatives and the revised Local Government 
Ordinances will have provided them with the legal mandate needed to ensure their 
sustainability and continuing existence.  The structure, composition, authority and 
responsibilities of these Boards (at the facility or sub-regional levels) would need to 
be clearly indicated and defined.  Their role should be pro-active rather than reactive.  
Because these CCBs would be elected by the local people the likelihood of ensuring 
that the poor are represented effectively on these Boards would increase.  Thus the 
poor will begin to have a voice. 
One can only wait and see. 
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“Governance, Decentralisation, and Poverty” is a large subject.  It is also clear 
that, notwithstanding the complexity of these topics, the authors have still handled it 
well.  In the brief span of 11 pages they have encompassed a very wide range of 
issues: the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights, on the one hand, and the Citizens 
Community Boards, on the other.  As we know, these Boards were promised by the 
National Reconstruction Bureau in their May 2000 document.  “Devolution of Power 
and Responsibility”. The authors have also quite appropriately clarified in their 
abstract that the central concern of their paper is to show how governance and 
decentralisation impinge on poverty, and to discuss what kind of mechanisms need to 
be set-up in the country to improve the situation so that institutions become pro-poor.  
This is not an easy task for anyone, and I must compliment them on having raised 
and discussed so ably these very difficult issues.   
I would also like to say that because the authors chose to range over a very 
wide domain, they inevitably found it difficult to give adequate time to any one of 
the major issues they raised or to look at them in greater depth.  In fact, just because 
of the way they have organised their paper, they have had to use rather general 
statements to make their points.  It also seems to me, and I might be wholly wrong, 
that in discussing these controversial issues, they seem to be somewhat reluctant to 
set out clearly the conclusions of their analysis.  It is of course one of their virtues 
that they always present fully both sides of the questions they raise, but, then, having 
done that, they withdraw from the conflict and seen to find comfort in sitting on the 
fence.  But, perhaps this a matter of individual temperament; perhaps it is good to be 
cautious and modest even though that does not necessarily help social analysis. 
Let me now to turn to some of the basic ideas in the paper.  As we can see 
from the text, the core of the paper consists of an extensive discussion of five issues: 
one—democracy; two—the rule of law; three—bureaucratic performance; four-
decentralisation and five—pro-poor institutions.  The paper has argued that it is these 
five ingredients that constitute the essence of the relationship between governance 
and poverty.  I will therefore now consider these ingredients one by one. 
Democracy First. I propose to deal with the authors’ discussion of 
democracy by responding to a question, perhaps a rhetorical question that they have 
raised.  “The question”, the authors point out, “that emerges from these arguments is 
have democratic governments in Pakistan been pro-poor?” The answer to this 
question, at least in my view and in the short and medium-term perspective is not 
very difficult to give.  But before I do so, let me say straight away that I do not think  Akhtar Mahmood  1028
“democracies tend to be more pro-poor than authoritarian governments”, nor do I 
agree with the view that  “democracies, more often than not, fail to deliver on pro-
poor programmes”.  I doubt very much if it is at all possible to establish a causal 
link, positive or negative, between democracy and poverty
1 except perhaps when one 
is discussing democracy in an ideological vein. 
As far as the specific question is concerned, I have no hesitation in saying  
that the experience of Pakistan in the years between 1988 and 1998, when more than 
a dozen unprincipled coalitions captured and lost control of the state machinery, was 
entirely bleak. In this period, growth rates slowed, unemployment increased, 
expenditures on education and health as a percent of the GDP stagnated and pverty 
increased.
2   The country also lost both the financial support and the moral respect of 
the international community. The fact of the matter is that in this period the 
economic decision-making machinery simply collapsed under the weight of its 
mediocre bureaucracy and its self-serving policies. 
Regretfully I have to say that democracy was wholly betrayed by the 
politicians, their intellectual advisors and their pusillanimous bureaucracy.   I doubt 
very much if we can name a principle of democracy that was not subverted by them.  
I believe that the country will have to begin all over again its experiment with 
democracy.  But to do so, democracy will have to be redefined.  The new democracy 
will have to address the two imbalances that threaten the solidarity of the country: 
the ethnic imbalance by qualifying majority rule and devolving real power to 
provinces and the economic imbalance by increasing the revenues of the state 
through appropriate taxation to increase social spending.  Democracy is necessary 
because this is the only worldly political arrangement in which human beings can 
live with some dignity, relatively free from the fear of the mafias of a modern state, 
and under which a citizen has some hope of protecting his/her economic interest. 
The Second Ingredient: The Rule of Law: It goes without saying that rule of 
law is a critical element in the organisation of an orderly and prosperous society.  Rule  
of law however is a very complex concept and its applications to social and economic 
affairs can not be divorced from considerations of efficiency or equity; it cannot be 
used just to defend any structure of property relations or to preserve any low-level 
social equilibria in the name of stability.  At the same time it is also difficult to discuss 
property rights without having clarified what property means in a constantly changing 
technological, economic, legal and social environment and how rights to it can be 
secured in a lawful manner. I do not think that in this gathering I need to labour the 
points: 
 
1India, the largest democracy: 34.4 percent of population lived in conditions of absolute poverty. 
[NSS (1977)]. Pakistan calorie-based approach: 1993-94: 20.8. Nearly 16.5 percent of Americans lived in 
poverty despite the country’s immense material wealth and generally higher per-capita income. The 
Human Development Report 1998. Population below $1 a day. Brazil 23.0 percent 1995, India 52.5 
percent 1992, Pakistan 11.6 percent 1991. 
2Pakistan Economic Survey 1999-00.  Comments  1029
  • that  the structure of political coalitions is linked to the structure of   
property rights. 
  • that  not all structures of property rights are consistent with widespread 
economic prosperity, and 
  • that some distributions of property rights are the biggest impediments to 
collective action by the poor.   
In this context, I must also say that even though the authors have begun their 
study by a reference to human rights they have not made any serious attempt to give 
them an operational sense nor have they discussed any where the crucial role civil 
liberties play in organising collective action.  I am afraid no discussion of poverty 
can be complete or meaningful without asking ourselves “By whom am I governed?” 
and  “ How much am I governed
3?” 
The Third Ingredient: Bureaucracy and Corruption.  It is now part of our 
folklore that bureaucracies everywhere are self-centered, and that their utility 
functions are not always consistent either with those of their principals, i.e., the 
political governments or with those of the general public.  The excesses of our 
bureaucracy cannot however be explained only by the considerations of the 
collective choice theory; we need to look both at history and the structure of power 
relations to understand them. 
I hope I am right in saying that both in the colonial and the post colonial days 
districts have been managed by the representatives of the state more or less in 
collusion with the dominant local groups.  The difference between the colonial and 
the current arrangements is that administrators are no longer the masters.  In fact, 
over the years and all over the country bureaucracy has lost most of its autonomy and 
is now playing an uneasy, subordinate role.  Quite clearly, this change has come 
about both as a result of the political and economic changes in the last half-century 
as well as the loss of the constitutional protections available to the colonial 
bureaucracy.  This loss has been a particularly traumatic experience for the national 
bureaucracy, and it seems to me that a large number of civil servants are still in the 
process of adjusting to their new, insecure status. 
Given what I have said before, I hardly need add that I agree with a great 
deal of what the authors have said about corruption, bureaucracy and good 
governance.  But their statement that  “the civil services should be taught that they 
are meant to implement policy and not make it” does not seem to me to be quite 
right.  I would say that in the day to day conduct of the business of a government, 
it is rarely possible to draw a sharp line between policy and implementation: in real 
life what  matters is not so much who makes a proposal but who approves it and 
who monitors its implementation.  Bureaucracy cannot but participate in the 
making of a policy. 
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The Forth Ingredient:  Decentralisation: I can recall that decentralisation 
has been a favourite themes of some civil servants and scholars since the 1950s, 
when US social scientists  introduced Village-Aid programmes into Pakistan.  I can 
also recall that since then it has been said over and over again by their critics that 
these are essentially political matters and that devolution and decentralisation can not 
make much headway so long as gross asymmetries of power, wealth, and coercive 
capacity persist.  I can therefore only reiterate that without a political arrangement 
dedicated to civil liberties, an efficient and effective judiciary, periodic elections and 
extensive deregulation (i.e., reduction in state controls and state interventions), 
technical adjustments such as changes in financial caps, amendments in 
establishment rules and some reshuffling of some marginal functions will not help. 
The Fifth Ingredient:  Pro-Poor Institutions: I confess that, like the authors 
of the study under discussion, I also look to the future for pro-poor institutions.  But I 
must not lose heart.  A journey of a thousand miles begins with a small step: only a 
few days ago elections to 21 union councils were held under the new dispensation 
and more are already in an advanced stage of preparation.  The problem with these 
elections however is that non-party elections once again push citizens back into 
forms of relations such as baradari systems, caste systems, relations of economic 
dependence that more often than not retard rather than promote higher and wider 
loyalties.   The redeeming feature of these elections is that they have provider a 
wider opportunity to women to participate in them.  I hope that this concern for the 
welfare of women will continue, and that soon reforms will be introduced to ensure 
that in the future no one can deny them what is lawfully theirs: their title to their 
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